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VALUATION IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
The interpretations of the amended and revised bankrupt-
cy act which have been rendered by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in their review of recent and pending
reorganizations of corporations in the Federal District courts
have restated a philosophy of corporate valuations which is
worthy of examination by the legal, accounting, and financial
professions. Under the revised bankruptcy act, as approved
in 1939,' the Securities and Exchange Commission is charged
with advising the Federal District Court of the fairness and
equity, as well as the feasibility of proposed plans of reorgan-
ization of corporations under Chapter X of the act, provided
that the assets involved exceed $3,000,000."
During the last two decades reorganization of industrial,
railroad and utility corporations has usually been effected by
means of adjustments in bond interest rates, extension of
mortgage maturities, changes in the legal status of either or
both bondholders and stockholders. The usual effect has been
to perpetuate the holdings of the equity holders. This con-
travention of the principles of dissolution and bankruptcy
law has, for the most part, been successful because of the use
of the principle of valuation according to appraisal, repro-
duction cost, or other accounting methods. The Securities
and Exchange Commission, in recent releases on corporate
reorganizations, has adopted the basis of valuation on cap-
italized earning power, basing its justification of method on
the Supreme Court decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co., Ltd.'
"No judgment with respect to the fairness of any plan of
reorganization of a debtor can be formulated without first
determining the value of its assets. The value of such assets
I H. R. 8046, 75th Congress, 3rd Session.
2 Ibid., Chap. X, Art. VII. § 172.
3 308 U. S. 106 (1030).
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should be based primarily upon the reasonably prospective
earnings derivable from the utilization of those assets. That
is the position taken by the courts,4 and by the leading writ-
ers in the fields of law and finance.5 The reasonably pros-
pective earnings, in turn, are estimated upon the basis of
past earnings, adjusted to reflect the influence of changes
which have already taken place and those that are reason-
ably foreseeable." 6 The method of valuation of assets thus
advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission has
long been known in financial terminology as "going-concern"
value. By "going-concern" value of a corporation is meant
the capitalization of estimated prospective or actual earn-
ings at a rate of return commensurate with the risks involved
in the normal pursuit of the corporation's business.7 Concern-
ing the rate at which the prospective earnings are to be cap-
italized, the Securities and Exchange Commission has said:
"The rate at which earnings are to be capitalized must be
predicated upon the risks inherent in the business and the-de-
gree of uncertainty that attaches to the continuation of the
earnings. An estimate of the prospective earnings of a busi-
ness enterprise, even though based on reasonable and appro-
priate premises, is subject to risk and uncertainty of realiza-
tion. If the company has a long established record of profit-
able operations and if no materially adverse change in con-
ditions is foreseeable, the degree of risk and uncertainty is
reduced. Likewise, if the company has an established posi-
tion in an industry in which cyclical fluctuations have not
been severe or which gives evidence of marked future growth,
the degree of uncertainty is minimized." '
4 Cf. Temmer v. Denver Tramway Co., 18 F. 2d 226 (1927); In re Con-
solidation Coal Co., 11 F. Supp. 594 (1935); In re Wickwire Spencer Steel Co.,
12 F. Supp. 528 (1935).
•) BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1935), Vol. I at 238; DEWING, THE
FIANcrA. POLICY OF CORPORATIONS, (3d ed., 1934) at 140; FINLETTER, THE LAW
or BANKRUPTcY REORGANIZATION (1939), pp. 557, 567.
6 SECURITIES AD EXCHANGE COMMISsIoN. Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 29. In the Matter of Minnesota and Ontario Paper Company. (1940) pp. 18-19.
7 DEWING, op. cit., p. 145.
8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
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The impact of the adoption of the "going-concern" method
of valuation on reorganizations of corporations has caused
numerous applications of the bankruptcy law regarding
priority of claims against assets. The underlying theory has
been expressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in many of its corporate reorganization reports. "The law is
well established that the inclusion of a class of security
holders in a plan of reorganization depends upon the exist-
ence of an equity for that class. A plan is not 'fair and equi-
table' unless it provides participation for claims and interests
in recognition of their priorities, and the value of the debtor's
properties supports the extent of the participation accorded
to each participating class. If the effect of a plan is to divert
to a junior class values allocable to senior security holders,
the plan fails to meet the requisite statutory and judicial
standards.' The United States Supreme Court has recently
reaffirmed that doctrine, holding that creditors must be fully
compensated before stockholders are permitted to participate
and that where the claims of the creditors exceed the value
of the debtor's assets, all such assets must be applied to the
satisfaction of creditors' claims. The allocation of any par-
ticipation to stockholders in such a case, except on the basis
of a necessary contribution, was held to be unfair to the
creditors and therefore illegal.'" The same principle has
been applied between senior and junior creditors," between
creditors and stockholders of a solvent corporation,' 2 and
between classes of stockholders." '" In apparent reply to the
suggestions that senior security holders would accept a lower
rate of capitalization in preference to a forced liquidation
of an insolvent corporation, a condition which would allow




12 In re' Chicago Great Western Ry., 29 F. Supp. 59 (1939); cf. Tellier v.
Franks Laundry Co., 101 F. 2d 561 (1939).
13 SECURIIES AND EXCHANGE CoMmISSION. Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 23. In the Matter of Deep Rock Oil Corporation. (1940) p. 18.
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at least a possibility of a larger percentage of recovery from
the investment, ihe Commission has added: "Only after an
estimate of value is reached, on the basis of a proper rate of
capitalization, is it possible to determine whether the cred-
itors might prefer reorganization to liquidation. The fact
that creditors might .prefer reorganization to liquidation for
other reasons has no bearing on how much the property
would be worth as a going concern, or what would be the
proper rate of capitalization in determining that worth."
(Italics mine.)14
In illustration of the method in which the principles thus
advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission have
been applied, reference is made to three opinions of cor-
porate reorganization plans, all released to the public by the
Commission in April, 1940.
The construction of the San Mateo-Hayward Toll Bridge
across San Francisco Bay was completed by the San Fran-
cisco Bay Toll-Bridge Company in 1929 under a franchise
expiring in 1977.15 The original financing was accomplished
by the public sale of $4,500,000 of 30-year 62 % first mort-
gage bonds and $2,000,000 of 15-year 7% debentures, all
dated November 1, 1927. In payment of remaining bridge
and franchise costs, small amounts of preferred and com-
mon stocks were also issued. From the opening of the toll
bridge in 1929 the company failed to earn even its interest
charges. In September, 1931, a readjustment was effected
with the obligation holders to change the debentures to quasi-
income bonds, and to modify the sinking fund provisions for
both issues. However, interest payments. on the mortgage
bonds were finally defaulted in May, 1937, and when further
readjustments proposed by the company were rejected by the
bondholders, reorganization proceedings were instituted in
14 SECURrrmEs AND EXCffwGE COMMISSION. Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 22. In the Matter of Flour Mills of America, Inc. (1940) p. 18.
1i SEcURnris AND EXCHANGE COMMISsION. Corporate Reorganization Release
No. 21. In the Matter of San Francisco Bay Toll-Bridge Company. (1940).
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the Federal Courts under Chapter X of the amended Bank-
ruptcy Act 1, on August 17, 1939. Since the book valuation
of the company's assets, less depreciation, was given as
$5,500,000, the -Securities and Exchange Commission became
a party to the proceedings.
Under the plan of reorganization proposed by the trustee,
bondholders were to receive for each $1000 bond, equivalent
amounts of 6y % income bonds and 20 shares of Class A
(preference) stock, while the debenture holders received one
share of Class B (common) for each $1000 bond. No pro-
vision was made for either the preferred or common stock-
holders.
In reviewing this plan, the Commission began by estimat-
ing minimum annual interest charges at $279,700, without
provision for bond retirements before the expiration of the
franchise, and in addition $53,700 preferred dividends would
accrue. On the basis of past records, annual gross income
was estimated at $300,000, subject to operating expenses
of $120,000. The resultant estimated maximum earnings of
$180,000 would thus be insufficient to meet even the fixed
charges, much less the .dividend requirements or provisions
for bond retirements. The net effect of the plan would be,
in the eyes of the Commission, to increase the initial debt of
$4,303,000 to about $8,000,000 at the maturity of the
bonds, eight and one-half months before the expiration of
the franchise, plus dividend arrearages of about $2,000,000.
Obviously, the plan was inequitable to the mortgage holders
on the basis of available earnings. The Commission conclud-
ed that, using the reasonable capitalization rate of 8% to
10%, the corporation's value was $2,111,000, a sharp reduc-
tion from the book valuation of $5,500,000. In its opinion
the Commission stated: "On the basis of our opinion that a
fair value for the Debtor's properties does not exceed
$2,111,000, there is a substantial deficiency in the value
16, Op. ci. supra n. 1.
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necessary, to satisfy the prior claims of the first mortgage
bondholders. As of November 1, 1939, these claims aggre-
gated approximately $5,100,000. In accordance, therefore,
with settled principles of reorganization law, no basis ap-
pears upon which any interests junior' to these claims may
properly be recognized in the plan of reorganization." 17
Flour Mills of America,' Inc., a holding company over mill-
ing, distributing and elevator facilities, encountered finan-
cial difficulties after 1930 following a rapid loss of its mill-
ing business. 8 Beginning with 1930, however, the inanage-
ment began to engage inhreasingly in speculation in the
grain market, and became more interested in grain trading
than in flour milling, but there is evidence to believe that
the operating profits in 1930-1934 were the result of the
corporation's president's successful grain trading. In later
years, however, the speculative trading was responsible, at
least in part, for the operating losses reported. In 1935 a
voluntary reorganization was effected, but continued losses
forced the company into the Federal Courts under Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act in March, 1939. The capitalization
at that time, including interest arrears,' amounted to
$2,906,033 of 6 % notes, due. 1945, and 25,000 shares of
preferred and 400,065 shares of common stock.
The plan of reorganization proposed by the trustees called
for an exchange of outstanding bonds for 4% convertible
notes., a voluntary abandonment of claims on interest ar-
rearages, and 200,000 shares of common for the holders of
the old preferred shares. An alternate proposal made by the
bondholders' committee gave all the new common to the
bondholders for interest arrears, thus excluding the holders
of the old preferred stock from participation in the succes-
sor corporation.
17 Op. cit., p. 14.
IS Op. cit. supra n. 14.
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Commenting on the plan, the Commission estimates the
valuation of the corporation at 12% on the trustee's esti-
mate of earnings, which the Commission argued was exces-
sive, at $2,160,000, compared with liabilities of about
$2,900,000. Obviously the plans were considered "not fair
and equitable." Since the trustee advocated a capitalization
rate of 8%, which would result in a large valuation of the
corporation, the Commission stated that the policy of review-
ing the rates of capitalization was contingent on the specific
company, rather than on the average rate for the industry.
The 8% rate advocated was based on the presented evidence
that other companies in the flour industry were operating on
this rate of return. 9 However, this rate appears to have been
based on the return of the two most successful companies in
the trade, rather than on the more comparable marginal,
smaller companies, such as the corporation under considera-
tion.
Since the additional argument thus arising involves the
distinguishing between solvent and insolvent companies, the
comparisons of the standards involved in both cases should
be reviewed. Cases of insolvency are fully covered in the Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co., Ltd., case.2 While no cases
involving solvent companies have been carried to the Su-
preme Court, the Commission cites lower court decisions in
part. "On any distribution of the assets of a corporation
having issued both preferred and common stock, if the as-
sets are insufficient to satisfy the preferred stockholders, the
common stockholders may not participate in the distribution.
These are property rights which may not be disturbed even
in bankruptcy." 21 And again;"Stockholders may not better
their position at the cost of bondholders or other creditors;
and to justify a retention of a stock interest by stockholders
19 Trustee's Report, pp. 59-63, 148. 788-792.
20 Op. cit.
21 In re Utilities Power and Light Corp., 29 F. Supp. 763 (1939), appeal dis-
missed C. C. A. 7th, Mar. 9, 1940.
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of a debtor it must appear that they have furnished some
compensatory additional consideration or have an equity in
the estate of the debtor after the rights of creditors are fully
provided for." 22 It must thus be construed that the treat-
ment of security holders must be in order of priority insofar
as the corporate valuation will permit.
Insufficient capitalization, parent company mismanage-
ment and unfavorable operations caused reorganization pro-
ceedings in 1934 for the Deep Rock Oil Corporation, a much
publicized subsidiary of Standard Gas and Electric Corpora-
tion."3 A plan which left Standard Gas in control of the re-
organized company, notwithstanding the rights of the pre-
ferred stockholders was carried to the Supreme Court and
a favorable remanding to the lower courts was rendered in
1938.24 A resultant new plan was formed in 1940, proposing
to replace $12,900,000 of 6% convertible gold notes due
1933 and interest arrears by $5,500,000 of 6% sinking fund
-debentures due in 1951 and 400,000 shares of common
stock. An added 100,000 shares of common stock would be
allocated to holders of the 50,000 shares of the old 7% con-
vertible preferred stock. The claim of Standard Gas for
$6,129,248 on loans as well as ownership of 599,475 shares
of common stock were adjudged valueless. A second plan,
proposed by a bondholders' committee provided for
$7,000,000 of 5% debentures due in 1955 and only 250,000
shares of common, all to be given to the bondholders.
In its report the Commission approved the trustee's plan,
provided the preferred stockholders were excluded from the
final plan. The method of arriving at this conclusion is of
interest. In 1936, the properties were appraised at
$16,800,000,25 and the District Court as well as the Supreme
Court in the 1936 hearing found that the properties were of
22 Sophian v. Congress Realty Co., 98 F. 2d 499 (1938).
23 Op. Cit.
24 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 114.
25 Appeal Record, Vol. I, p. 361.
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a value ihot in excess of $17,000,000.26 In this connection,
the Commission states, "neither the District Court nor the
Supreme Court did more than fix a maximum value which
could be attributed to the property of the Debtor. There has
been no finding which would preclude this Court now from
considering a value other than the maximum value found in
the appraisal. . . . Insofar as the Non-Producing Depart-
ments are concerned, we believe that the appraisal was pred-
icated on an erroneous principle. The earnings from such
properties are the measure of their value to the Debtor as a
going concern and such value is substantially less than the
appraised value." .27 On this basis, the preferred stockholders
are found to have no equity and are to be disregarded in the
final plan. In settling upon the interest rate for the new
securities, it is interesting to students of finance to note that
the low rates of money markets are not to be considered,
but that the bondholders must be compensated for their
present claim, and that only new financing could properly
allow the prevailing money rates to regulate the coupon
rate.28
The Securities and Exchange Commission has, insofar as
can be learned from its opinions issued to date, settled upon
two basic points in its interpretation of Chapter X of the
amended bankruptcy act. Emphasis is placed on the priority
of claims, including interest arrears and dividend payments
not declared prior to the initiation of the receivership pro-
ceedings,"-2" and the establishment of corporate valuations
on the basis of "going-concern" earnings capitalized at rea-
sonable rates of return, dependent on individual risk and
uncertainty circumstances. The rates advocated by the Com-
26 Ibid., pp. 371-372; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Company, 366 U. S.
307.
27 Op. cit., p. 18.
28 Ibid., note at p. 21.
29 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COmmISSioN. corporate Reorganization Release
No. 33. In the Matter of Minnesota and Ontario Paper Company. (1940). Memo-
randum supplementing advisory report (op. cit.).
VALUATION IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
mission appear to vary, for the most part, between 8% and
10%, somewhat lower than those suggested in the Commis-
sion's chief financial reference, Professor Dewing's text-
book on corporate finance."0 Asset valuation, whether based
on reproduction cost, on original cost less depreciation, or
on appraisal value, has little to do with the final value of a
corporation unless backed by earning power at a conserva-
tive rate of capitalization. The implications of adoption of
this theory of valuation poses some problems for account-
ants and tax experts and may lead to further court actions.
As presently construed, the law approves two opposing
theories of accounting and finance; some resolution of the
paradox must be made.
The evident purpose of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission is so to advise the Federal District Courts in re-
organization plans submitted under Chapter X of the re-
vised bankruptcy act that the resulting obligations will not
rebound into the courts at a later date with the liability for
such action laid at the door of the Commission. This is a
shrewd political as well as a sound economic and financial
maneuver.
The effects of the conclusions reached may be far-reaching.
In the railroad and utilities industries, the Commission's the-
ories may presage a drastic reduction in the capitalizations
of corporations now or in future process of reorganization.
The plans currently proposed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission give evidence that the current philosophy of
that group is being molded to agree with that held by the
more financially adept Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion."' Applied to industrial corporations, the theory has
already provided many interesting conjectural situations.
30 DEwno, op. cit., at 175.
31 Exemplified by the Wheeler-Lea bill, proposed in 1939 but not passed,
which gave permission to use "going-concern" value in establishing railroad valu-
ations for reorganization purposes; the valuation principle of the Esch-Cummins
Act (1920), amending the Act to Regulate Commerce (1887).
28 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
among them the McKesson and Robbins Corporation re-
organization in the Federal District Court for Southern
New York, in which the common stockholders appear to
have no legal participation if asset valuation principles are
used, but have a substantial interest if the "going-concern"
principle is followed.
Francis J. Calkins.
Edward N. Hurley College of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce, University of Notre Dame.
